

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000800040046-6

25X1

10 February 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Indochina Matters

1. Attached is the printed version of the memorandum on Hanoi's intentions that we sent to the White House as part of the package sent down on the evening of 9 February.

2. Per your suggestion, we talked to Latimer on 9 February and I have talked to him again this morning (10 February). Our pitch was that the situation in Laos had certainly not improved in the last few days and in fact the battlefield situation -- especially in MR's I, III and IV -- had gotten precipitously more parlous, though, not (yet) to the point of collapse. Latimer has assured us that this is the line the NSC Staff has been giving Henry over the past several days. It is also the line that the Mission in Vientiane [redacted] has been emphasizing in its briefs right up to the moment of Kissinger's departure for Hanoi. Latimer also told me [redacted] reinforcing the briefs they were already giving by instructing that Kissinger be given a very blunt account of how the situation was worsening (this instruction was carried out by, among other things, a special report sent to catch Kissinger in Bangkok).

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000800040046-6

SECRET

25X1


SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000800040046-6

25X1

4. Latimer assured me that Kissinger is very much on notice about the diceyness of the situation with Laos and such notice is amply documented in the record. Actually, the Laos situation -- at least in MR IV -- is a trifle brighter today, partly as a result of a visit by General Vogt (and senior staff) to Pakse which had the happy consequence of unsnarling some air support problems.

5. In addition to the problems in Laos, there has been quite heavy action around Quang Tri where, on 9 February, GVN Marine and air borne positions took more than 1400 rounds of artillery and mortar fire. If this kind of activity continues sporadically during next week (and I believe it probably will), I plan to send Henry a private note warning him bluntly that the North Vietnamese -- in every sphere -- are going to press up to the point where we react. Their behavior will be similar to behavior all parents have experienced in their adolescent offspring: pushing in every direction to ascertain if there are indeed limits to parental tolerance and, if so, just where those limits are.


George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

25X1

Attachment

Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000800040046-6

SECRET

25X1